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This thesis project focuses on mediation in the context of civil conflict. There are various 
possible solutions to civil conflict. The parties may resort to the use of violence through 
military victories but there are also other peaceful solutions such as mediation. Although 
several methods are available to solve civil conflict, mediation has shown to have its 
successes in this area. Mediation, where a third party acts as a facilitator, allows for both 
warring parties to work quietly with the mediator, present their complaints and use the 
third party to become a go-between towards finding an acceptable solution that benefits 
them both. Mediation can happen in many forms, a state, an institution or an individual 
can sponsor it. This project will mainly focus on the individual acting as a mediator and 
how this personalized method can increase the prospects for sustainable peace. 
Additionally, it will look at the challenges that mediators face during the process and how 
they overcome them and it will look into the aftermath of the mediation process and what 





This thesis project focuses on mediation in the context of civil conflict. There are 
various possible solutions to civil conflict. The parties may resort to the use of violence 
through military victories but there are also other peaceful solutions such as mediation. 
Although several methods are available to solve civil conflict, mediation has shown to 
have its successes in this area. Mediation, where a third party acts as a facilitator, allows 
for both warring parties to work quietly with the mediator, present their complaints and 
use the third party to become a go-between towards finding an acceptable solution that 
benefits them both. Mediation can happen in many forms, a state, an institution or an 
individual can sponsor it. This project will mainly focus on the individual acting as a 
mediator and how this personalized method can increase the prospects for sustainable 
peace. 
Civil conflict plagues many countries and regions across the globe. Many 
countries around the world are victims of civil conflict but at the same time hope to find a 
long-term solution. However, most of the time the parties to the violence are unable to 
find that solution on their own. Civil conflict does not only affect the country of origin 
but it also places burdens on neighboring countries. People affected by civil conflict often 
flee across borders to escape the consequences of war; many have lost their families or 
even their homes. Rebel groups can also seek refuge in neighboring countries to escape 
being caught by the government and face charges for their crimes. The consequences of 
civil conflict create a spillover effect and therefore call for the attention of the 
international community. This is where the intervention of mediators comes in to help a 
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country do what they themselves have been unable to accomplish. Mediation, however, is 
not exempt from failure but it is essential to learn from mistakes made and apply that to 
future cases. I argue that mediation is an important tool and resource to have during peace 
talks. I also argue that careful selection of a mediator must include actors who have 
previous experience in civil conflict resolution and also the ability to help build trust 
among the parties. Thirdly, I argue that a mediator must maintain his or her impartiality 
and not be perceived as taking sides with one party or the other. If impartiality is not 
maintained, the aggrieved party will simply defect. Commitment to the process is also 
essential in achieving a permanent solution. 
My research questions include the following: 
• What is a good definition of mediation? 
• What are some good examples of successful mediation? 
• Who selects mediators and what criteria are they looking for? 
• When can we say mediation has been successful?  
• How do mediators build trust? 
• When is it useful to the peace process to grant perpetrators amnesty? 
• Can bias ever help reach peace? 
• Why do third parties accept to be a mediator? 
• Are mediators ever self-interested? 
• What are the most effective strategies in mediation? 
• What assets does a mediator bring to the process, things such as incentives for the 
parties? 
• Is there a difference between mediation and leverage and how do they interact? 
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Mediators can bring assets to the negotiating table. They can bring previous 
experience in personal knowledge of the history of the region and is some cases have 
mediated other civil conflicts. Mediators can often garner incentives from states, donors, 
or international organizations. A mediator often represents an institution or a government, 
which is usually where incentives for reaching peace come from. Such incentives can be 
foreign aid, which provides great help to those who have been affected by war. I believe 
mediation is a personalized method of reaching a peaceful solution, which builds trust 
and confidence between the warring parties, and this then facilitates the process and 
assures both parties that they will not leave empty handed. The conflicting parties worry 
because they feel they can be cheated from something they deserve, but mediators can 
help both parties build concessions where they will both benefit one way or another. Not 
only do the warring parties need to commit to the process but mediators should also be 
willing to commit from beginning to end. They will be the ones who will get to know the 
process and who will be able to guide the parties to a successful agreement to reach 
peace. If mediators are present from beginning to end, it can help mitigate the possibility 
of the conflict from breaking out once again. This thesis will also examine whether 
impartiality is a requisite to being a mediator. Although some scholars argue that 
impartiality is not always necessary and that a biased mediator may equally have success, 
I argue against this position. Impartially is the key to being a successful mediator. 
The methodology undertaken by this thesis relies on academic articles, books, essays, 
interviews and online sources that have already been written on the subject. I also use 
United Nations documents written on mediation and the use of mediators by the UN. I 
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use that information to support my hypothesis and as well utilize case studies of countries 




Review of the Literature 
Civil conflict is still widespread in the 21st century, but that does not mean 
something isn’t being done about it. For years civil conflict has divided nations and 
people leading to the outbreak of war and the creation of guerilla groups. Most of the 
time these groups have a political goal that they seek to reach, mostly by using violence. 
This is the case of several war-torn countries around the world, especially countries with 
weak governments that are incapable of dealing with the issue themselves. Some 
examples are El Salvador with the FMLN, Hamas in Palestine and the FARC in 
Colombia, to name a few. Each of these groups has or had a political objective, which 
they sought to achieve through violence, but at the same time there are other countries, 
institutions and even people who are willing to intervene in these civil conflicts to bring 
peace to these war torn countries. Civil conflict has several solutions, the use of hard 
power by the government or through peaceful solutions through direct negotiations or 
through third party mediation where both parties are willing to end the conflict and seek a 
political rather than a military solution. The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate that 
peace talks can be successful and although many factors can lead to a successful and 
peaceful outcome during a civil conflict, mediators play an important role in creating a 
favorable outcome for both parties in the process. 
Solving civil conflict through peace talks is something that lately, seems to be 
practiced with more frequency and identifying the reasons of how peace talks can be 
successful can help in future cases. I argue that mediators, as individuals, can lead peace 
talks to be successful. There must also be a reason why these individuals accept the role 
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of mediator in a civil conflict. Some argue that a third party may accept becoming a 
mediator because of “…identity factors such as being a neighboring state to the country 
in conflict, prior involvement in the dispute, a shared defense pact, and a former colonial 
tie as increasing the chance that a state will agree to act as a mediator” (Wallensteen and 
Svensson 2014: 318). It is clear that there must be some sort of tie, whether direct of 
indirect, between the mediator and the conflict in question. This will become even more 
evident in the case studies of Colombia with FARC and El Salvador with FMLN. I argue 
that mediators have a link one way or another to the conflict or to the region and this tie 
can greatly influence a third party to become a mediator in a certain civil conflict. If this 
is the case, it will not only increase the chances for peace talks to be successful but also 
for a peace agreement to be signed by the two warring parties and that consequently 
peace can be long lasting because of the commitment to the issue.  
Mediation as a method 
Mediation is defined as the act of intervention, which does not necessarily have to 
be in civil conflict, but it is a method used to get both conflicting parties together and find 
a solution to the problem. Wall Jr. and Druckman define mediation as the “... assistance 
to interacting parties by a third party who may or may not have authority to impose an 
outcome” (Wall Jr. and Druckman 2003: 694). A discussion of mediation must also 
include an analysis of leverage. Leverage can be a tool of mediation, which can be 
defined as “… the use of pressure where actors can utilize a set of instruments that 
compel others into taking actions or refraining from undesired acts” (Krasno 2004: x). 
Leverage can enhance the chances of success in resolving civil conflict if the mediator 
can put pressure on either one of the parties to accept a proposed agreement (Ott 1972: 
 
 10 
599). Leverage then, is just a way of enhancing the method of mediation and should not 
be a tool that is easily discarded as it can make a great difference in the outcome. Things 
such as leverage are what have helped mediation become a successful tool for resolving 
civil conflict. 
Some scholars conclude that mediation has improved a great deal since it has 
become the preferred method of conflict resolution compared to military victories 
(Wallensteen and Svensson 2014). If this is the case, it means that mediation can be 
successful in its objective but one must be careful about applying the same methods to 
different conflicts. Mediation is not exempt from facing failures, just like deploying 
peacekeeping troops has faced failures in the past. It can be a successful method, but it 
must be molded to the civil conflict in question. I argue that the main strategy for 
mediation to be successful is commitment. If things seem to fall apart along the way it 
should not mean giving up on a solution but rather learning from those mistakes and look 
for an improved solution. This was the case of the Philippines who acted as a mediator in 
the Sabah dispute with Malaysia and despite many failed efforts it did not give up its role 
as a mediator (Ott 1972). What makes mediators an important and powerful tool to have 
is that they are always present in peace talks and can help both parties find a mutually 
acceptable solution but not to the point where one will be left vulnerable. “Mediators 
often possess experience in past conflict resolution attempts, carry with them legitimacy, 
and can provide technical support to the state, each of which may supplement the state's 
capacity and help all sides come to an agreement” (DeRouen Jr. et. al 2010: 336). More 
specifically, weak states can benefit from mediators who have experience in past conflict 
resolution attempts, that way they can guide them through successful peace talks where 
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neither side gives up too much in order to reach peace. “Both before and after the signing 
of agreements, mediation focuses on the political process: it tries to keep the signatories 
of the peace agreement engaged, to bring new parties in the process, and to expand as 
much as possible political participation” (Papagianni 2010: 245). The idea of having 
mediators should mean that they will be present from the beginning until the end because 
if not the process could be vain. Even after signing the peace agreement there is still a 
chance that fighting may reoccur, however, that is why mediators are present, to keep 
each party focused on the objective and that no party may go astray from that objective. 
Scholarly articles highlight two types of mediation methods which are available to make 
sure the peace process is right on track, the biased mediator versus the impartial mediator.  
Biased vs. Impartial 
Mediators can assure both parties that there is an equal willingness to reach peace 
even though one of the parties is in a much weaker position. Biased mediators can be 
defined as those who lean more towards a certain group and will try to help that group 
obtain the most gains as opposed to the other group. “Previous research has suggested 
that biased third parties may mitigate commitment problems between parties, by serving 
as guarantors for the weakening side” (Svensson 2007: 177). Svensson argues that biased 
mediators can make sure that the supported weaker party will adhere to their 
commitments and will be fairly treated throughout the peace process. Additionally, he 
argues that mediators who are biased towards the rebel group have fewer incentives to 
protect the government and rebels can end up backing out from a peace agreement 
(Svensson 2009). However, mediators that are biased towards the rebel group can present 
problems; amnesty can be granted to perpetrators preventing them from paying for their 
 
 12 
crimes. This does not always have to be the case, but should be something to take into 
account when many of these groups have committed war crimes. Although Svensson's 
argument can hold true in some cases it still has many holes. It seems almost impossible 
to believe that a group will accept a biased mediator who is leaning toward the opposing 
side, knowing that they will face a win-lose situation. If one of the parties sees that a 
mediator is being biased toward the other group, they can easily back out from 
negotiations. They would probably have more to gain in continuing the conflict, than in 
accepting a mediator who is biased and will end up hurting their interests. It is as if you 
are negotiating the price of a product with the store owner and someone interferes to help 
out but it turns out that that person is leaning more toward the owner’s side. Your 
ultimate decision would simply be to walk away and not buy the product. The same thing 
goes for either the insurgent group or the government; no party is willing to end up losing 
more while the other party gains all the benefits. 
On the other hand, impartial mediators, which can be defined as those who choose 
neither side yet still continue to be part of the peace process, can provide equal chances 
for successful peace talks. Young argues that, “the existence of a meaningful role for a 
third party will depend on the party's being perceived as an impartial participant (in the 
sense of having nothing to gain from aiding either protagonist)…” (Young 1967: 81). If 
the mediator is to be impartial, it does not mean that he or she has no preference in what 
the outcome will be but rather that he or she must treat both parties the same way 
procedurally. Impartial mediators can provide support to both the weak side and the 
strong side and can equally make sure that no two sides end up giving too much to be left 
vulnerable before the other. An impartial mediator can build trust with both parties, 
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something that the biased mediator will never be able to do and trust becomes essential in 
getting the parties to come together. Mediators as individuals, as opposed to mediators as 
states, have the highest probability of creating a relationship between the two disputing 
parties, which will give him/her leverage in the long run. In this aspect, the benefit of 
having the mediator be an individual instead of a state is that individuals are not as self-
interested as states, seeking something in return. Here the requirement of a state or a 
person is that their goal is peace and not a particular outcome for either party. Mediating 
states can be self-interested because they can ask the host government for something in 
exchange for their help in conflict resolution while an individual does not have the 
authority to demand anything in exchange. In the case of failed peace agreements or in 
the immediate post agreement period, mediators have the duty of keeping the momentum 
of the dialogue between the parties in order to keep the public’s confidence in the peace 
efforts. Mediators urge parties to continue negotiating on things that might have been put 
aside during negotiations. During a peace process, mediation skills never become 
irrelevant as they can work side by side with peacekeepers to make the process a much 
stronger one with the hope of it being successful. Mediators can also provide technical 
experts, to assist the parties in writing constitutions, holding elections, and strategies for 
power sharing.  
This thesis will further support mediation as a tool of conflict resolution by using 
Colombia and El Salvador as cases studies. For years mediation has been used to solve 
civil conflict or even many types disputes, not just in civil conflict, and it continues to be 
a method actors turn to because it works. Some might argue that it doesn’t work because 
there are always such things as interests from each party or even time can be a factor to 
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question how well mediation works in conflict resolution. Interests, however, is what 
keeps the process moving; each party is fighting for something. Time should not be a 
factor that questions a process that relies on time, especially when the conflict has been 
going for more than a decade. In taking such things into consideration, this thesis gives 
further insight on the work that is put into mediation in order to have a successful 
solution. Such things as commissions are especially created to address specific issues, 
which gives further credibility to the process. Certain steps in the mediation process are 
replicated in other countries that have lived through or are living through civil conflict 






Mediation in International and Civil Conflict 
Civil conflict is generally between two organized groups in the same country. One 
of the sides, usually the rebel group, seeks a political outcome usually through the use of 
violence. Their objectives can range from taking control of the country, self-
determination or political participation. Some organized groups get so violent that they 
go on to be considered as terrorist groups, however, civil conflict can only last so long. 
Unless a permanent solution has been achieved civil conflicts can be very unpredictable, 
they can be dormant for a while and restart again. “Since the end of World War II, there 
have been a total of 231 armed conflicts active in 151 locations throughout the world. 
During the 17 years since the end of the Cold War, the corresponding numbers are 121 
conflicts in 81 locations” (Harbon, Högbladh and Wallesteen 2006: 617). By 2005, the 
number of civil conflicts summed up to 31, and although the number has decreased by a 
large amount since the end of World War II, the Cold War sparked many civil conflicts, 
especially in South America. Even though the numbers have dropped significantly it does 
not mean something isn’t being done about it. International organizations such as the 
United Nations have implemented such things as peacekeeping missions and state actors 
have intervened through mediation practices in the hope to end civil conflicts. 
Mediation efforts have not always been practiced in civil conflict, but it is also a 
tool used during moments of international conflict, although perhaps more challenging 
because of the number of big actors involved, however, not impossible. During the 1900s 
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the international system witnessed so many changes due to ongoing wars that it also 
affected the means of resolving these wars.  
The past fifty years have seen an increase in the demand for mediators, 
partly because the international system changed profoundly during that 
period: the end of World War II, the emergence of bipolarity of the Cold 
War, the rapid decolonization of vast areas of the globe, and the shift to 
the post-Cold War era. During the Cold War, meditators were used to 
positive effect in a number of major international crises” (Crocker, 
Hamson and Aall 1999: 5).  
The international system has gone through numerous changes and most of these have 
sparked civil conflicts. Conflict seems to be a constant thought-out history, whether 
international or civil. Regardless of the different type of conflict, mediation has always 
been an option to resolve this problem. “The use of mediation to deal with conflicts in the 
international system began to rise significantly during the 1960s, more than doubling 
from 1950-levels. Mediation increased by another third during the 1970s, with its use 
leveling off during the 1980s” (Grieg and Diehl 2012: 33). With the outbreak of war one 
would expect for the number of mediation efforts to increase as well. The 1900s were a 
moment of change; there were numerous wars some more notorious than others and these 
wars also led to the creation of new states. The creation of more states meant that there 
were more international actors that could potentially play the role of mediators to prevent 
the further outbreak of violence. Most of the mediation efforts were focused on interstate 
conflicts and this lead for many to change their focus to civil conflict. “Since the end of 
the Cold War, the international community and the UN have moved beyond traditional 
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peacekeeping, becoming much more involved in civil conflicts. Doing so has meant 
adding a new set of functions—election monitoring, police training, sometimes even 
administering the state—to facilitate the transition from war to peace” (Fortna 2003: 97). 
As actors started to change their focus from international conflict to civil conflict the 
strategies used to resolve these conflicts changed as well. The strategies that were used in 
mediating international conflict could no longer apply to civil conflict mediation. The 
United Nations has been one of those entities that has specialized itself in civil conflict 
mediation, especially after being an active mediator in dangerous conflicts such as the 
one between India and Pakistan. “The United Nations, however, has devoted its greatest 
attention to civil conflicts, directing more than one third of its 888 post-World War II 
mediation efforts to just four conflicts: the civil war in former Yugoslavia, the conflict in 
Cyprus, Angola’s civil war, and the Western Sahara conflict respectively” (Grieg and 
Diehl 2012: 68). The United Nations has managed to maintain its role in mediation; this 
is seen later on in the thesis, with the creation of good offices in the UN that provide 
mediation support. The United Nations has not been the only actor to provide mediation 
services; other international organizations have also become great contributors to this 
effort and even individuals themselves have intervened in ongoing disputes. The fact that 
the United Nation’s role as an international mediator has decreased is in part because they 
are many more entities that can provide the same support in civil conflict. Not only has 
the United Nations been limited by the competition it faces from other organizations but 
also by the interests of key member states, in particular the interests of the Permanent 
Five of the Security Council (P5). Due to these impeding interests many states have 
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decided to participate in mediation through supportive channels such as the friends group 







This thesis provides insight into how mediation can be used as a tool during 
conflict resolution. As conflicts evolve so must the way of approaching these problems 
and mediation has become a tool that many actors turn to. Mediation is not just about 
having an individual in the middle of conflicting parties and hope that that individual 
finds a solution. Mediation goes much further than that; it is about creating a relationship 
with the parties and working with them to agree on a solution. Many scholars have 
attempted to come up with the best definition of mediation, but for the purposes of this 
thesis I believe Christopher Moore has provided the best one so far: 
Mediation is a conflict resolution process in which a mutually acceptable 
third party, who has no authority to make binding decisions for disputants, 
intervenes in a conflict or dispute to assist involved parties to improve their 
relationships, enhance communications, and use effective problem-solving 
and negotiation procedures to reach voluntary and mutually acceptable 
understandings or agreements on contested issues (Moore p. 8, 2014). 
Mediation can be a very appealing tool to resort to during conflict resolution because in 
the end it is the conflicting parties that have ultimate authority over the result. This, 
however, does not mean that mediators do not have influence over decisions; they can 
have many cards up their sleeves. I will address this aspect later in the thesis in 
discussing how mediators can use leverage with the conflicting parties. I would also like 
to provide a definition on what conflict resolution means in order to understand how all 
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these terms are linked in the mediation process. It is important to note that conflict 
resolution does not ignore the root of the conflict or even suppress it. Bercovitch and 
Jackson define conflict resolution as “…a range of formal and informal activities undertaken 
by parties to a conflict, or outsiders, designed to limit and reduce the level of violence in 
conflict, and to achieve some understanding on the key issues in conflict, a political 
agreement, or a jointly acceptable decision on future interactions and distribution of 
resources” (Bercovitch and Jackson 2009: 14). By providing these definitions I hope to 
make the mediation process clearer and demonstrate the strength of mediation in conflict 
resolution. The first step in conflict resolution is to accept that there is a conflict and that 
there are possibilities of resolving that conflict, in this case the method for a solution, 
mediation. 
Timing of Mediation 
Before any mediation activity can start, it must be determined whether it is an 
appropriate moment to mediate a conflict. “If it is to succeed, a mediation initiative cannot be 
launched at just any time; the conflict must be ripe for the initiation of negotiation. Parties resolve 
their conflict only when they have to do so—when each party’s efforts to achieve a unilaterally 
satisfactory result are blocked and the parties feel trapped in an uncomfortable and costly 
predicament (Zartman and de Soto 2010: 5). Civil conflicts must be addressed with 
abundant caution; if not, it can further spark the violence and therefore decrease the 
chances for peace. In order for mediation to be an option both parties must be willing to 
enter negotiations and seek a solution. When both disputing parties accept that the only 
solution is through negotiations then one could say that the dispute is ripe. Many times 
disputing parties struggle to find a solution through other means such as a military 
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victory, however, most of the time this ends up in a failed attempt hurting both of the 
disputing parties.  
A plateau and its hurting stalemate begin when one side is unable to achieve 
its aims, to resolve the problem, or to win the conflict by itself; it is completed 
when the other side arrives at a similar perception. Each party must feel 
uncomfortable in the costly dead end it has reached. Both must perceive a 
plateau not as a momentary resting ground but as a flat, unpleasant terrain 
stretching into the future, providing no later possibilities for decisive 
escalation or for graceful escape (Touval and Zartman 1989: 125). 
This hurting stalemate is produced when neither party thinks that it can obtain victory in 
the conflict. Continuing the fight would mean great losses for both parties and if they 
continue to fight it will only hurt them both. When parties reach this plateau, they realize 
that the only way out of the conflict is through other means besides war, this was the case 
of the FMLN and the Salvadorian government.  
In November 1989, a major offensive by the [FMLN] failed to ignite a 
popular insurrection against the armed forces, leading it to conclude that 
negotiation was the only way out; the armed forces’ failure to crush the 
offensive brought the El Salvador government to the realization that, after 
eight years of effort, it could not defeat the insurgents, leaving negotiation 
as the only way out (Zartman and de Soto 2010: 12).  
The case of the FMLN and El Salvador, one that I will go into further detail later in the 
thesis, is a great example of two warring parties incapable of defeating each other 
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militarily and who finally realized that the only way out was through negotiations. This is 
when one can consider the conflict to be ripe for mediation. 
Mediation Process 
Mediation is understood to be an extension of negotiation or in other words a set 
of activities where the outcome will not be win-lose but rather win-win. The first step to 
take in the mediation process is to choose or find the ideal mediator. “Mediation is a 
voluntary process. This means that mediators cannot mediate unless they are perceived as 
reasonable, acceptable, knowledgeable, and able to secure the trust and cooperation of the 
disputants” (Bercovitch and Jackson 2009: 48). The ideal mediator should be accepted by 
both parties and should have good knowledge of the conflict he or she is mediating. The 
next step in the mediation process is either to initiate talks or pick up from where 
negotiations were left off. Getting to an agreement will be a long process, especially 
when two parties oppose each other, but Fisher and Ury come up with four principles to 
make the mediation process be trenchant: 1) Separating the parties from the issues; 2) 
Focusing on the interests; 3) Come up with more options; and 4) Use objective criteria 
(Fisher and Ury 1983). Some actors lack the ability to look past the ‘group’ and focus on 
the issue(s) at stake because they may feel that their interests are threatened. Building a 
good relationship is essential to the mediation process. That way each party can see from 
the point of view of the other party, understand their grievances and see themselves as a 
group working toward a solution and not as enemies. Each party will have their own 
position on the issue but it is their interests that really matter. The interests are what 
caused them to take that position (Fisher and Ury 1983). By focusing on the interests, 
each party will be able to present them and bargain among one another until they reach a 
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decision that benefits them both. In the third principle, parties may think that the only 
option is a win-lose situation because they rush to find a solution. The parties should be 
able to come together and come up with a range of options and pick the one that will 
benefit them both where the result won’t be win-lose. Lastly, the parties to a conflict 
should not cast aside the opportunity to use objective criteria, in this way parties can 
decide on what they should or should not agree upon. 
Applying these four principles to mediation can increase the chances of reaching a 
successful agreement; mediation is just the continuation of negotiation by other means 
(Bercovitch and Jackson 2009). Not only can methods such as these strengthen the role 
that mediation plays in conflict resolution, but also entities such as the United Nations 
who have been known to contribute a great deal to international peace and stability can 
teach others about the mediation process and possible strategies to use. Despite the many 
criticisms that the United Nations has faced it has done a great job in enhancing world 
stability by offering its good offices and mediations services (Kaloudis 1993). During the 
tenure of Secretary-General Kofi Annan, serious efforts to contribute to the growth and 
strengthening of mediation were evident. The Nigerian diplomat, Ibrahim Gambari who 
wanted to further strengthen the mediation services that the United Nations provided, 
recognized the value of mediation. Just as the UN has a stand-by facility in the 
humanitarian field, Gambari proposed to Secretary-General Kofi Annan to have the same 
thing but for mediation in the following note: “I have held some useful discussions with 
the Government of Norway, which would like to assist us in the establishment of a roster 
of mediation experts. The roster would be similar to existing humanitarian rosters but 
would consist of a pool of experts in aspects of mediation, facilitation and conflict 
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resolution” (Krasno 2012: 3947-3948). Gambari also highlighted the importance of 
making sure that the roster was geographically representative which would give an upper 
hand in the area of mediation, since civil conflict is widespread and not just in one region 
of the world. Contributing to this roster of professional mediators would be to strengthen 
the already established good offices and the mediation support capacity.  
The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), a group of states that does not align with or 
against any major power bloc, has recognized the contribution of these good offices in 
the pacific settlement of disputes and calls on the Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, to 
allocate further resources for his good offices from UN Member States (Krasno 2012: 
3437-3438). In improving the capacity, Stephen Stedman, Assistant to Secretary General, 
proposed the following to Kofi Annan: “training a new generation of international 
mediators; providing political and analytical support at DPA; providing logistical and 
other support for mediation and good offices at DPA; identifying UN best practices for 
mediation and good offices; and establishing better partnerships with regional and other 
mediators (Krasno 2012: 3437-3438). As noted earlier in this thesis, as conflicts evolve 
so must the method used to address them, however, this is not the only thing that has to 
change. People have to change as well, and this means training a generation of mediators 
that can potentially come up with better strategies. The UN has extensive knowledge in 
mediation and peacekeeping, probably one of the actors that has the most knowledge in 
the subject, and therefore can easily identify the best strategies of mediation to date. The 
UN has provided high quality mediators, some worthy to mention are Álvaro de Soto in 
the FMLN and Salvadorian government conflict and Staffan de Mistura in the Syrian 
conflict. Both have demonstrated the high quality of mediation that the UN has to offer. 
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Although, even those who do not come directly from the UN can equally provide good 
mediation skills as seen with Hector Acosta in the FARC and Colombian government 
conflict. 
Trust, Credibility and Leverage 
One of the biggest obstacles that peace negotiations face is the lack of trust 
between disputing parties. Mistrust is understandable from both sides of the disputants, 
neither one is sure of the other’s intentions and neither wants to end up losing more than 
they are going to gain. One of the greatest contributions from mediators is their ability to 
build trust between the two parties who are unsure of each other’s intentions. Meditators 
can assure the parties that there is a willingness from all sides to reach peace without 
them having to give into the whims of the other party. I argue that trust is a key element 
to achieving a successful outcome. Since mediation is a voluntary process, mediators 
cannot mediate unless they are able to secure trust and cooperation from the disputing 
parties (Bercovitch and Jackson 2009). Mediators can help parties overcome their 
mistrust issues by building a relationship with both parties and hearing out their 
grievances. “Mediators are able to help with mistrust problems. For instance, if two 
disputants are engaged in an ongoing civil or international conflict but wish to conclude a 
peace treaty, a mediator can assure each side that the other is genuinely interested in 
peace and is not attempting to deceive and exploit them” (Kydd 2006: 449). Mediators 
are therefore the key actors during negotiations and are essential to building trust. 
Bercovitch and Jackson state that, in order for mediation to be effective mediators must 
be able to build trust and credibility and must also have a high degree of personal skill 
and competence (Bercovitch and Jackson 2009). When a mediator possesses such 
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qualities and is able to build qualities such as the ones mentioned above, mediation has a 
high chance of being effective. 
With building trust also comes the task of building credibility with the disputing 
parties. “Mediators build credibility with people or groups in conflict by developing 
expectations that the mediator and the mediation process will help them successfully 
address the issues in dispute” (Moore 2014: 223). The disputing parties must see that the 
mediators have the best intentions in helping them present their grievances and in turn 
helping them reach a solution to those grievances. Credibility is also a reflection of 
participating organizations, such as the United Nations. Actors will associate credibility 
with the mediator that is sent by any organization. If they are seen as legitimate and have 
a reputation for resolving disputes their credibility will be evident with the disputing 
parties. However, if the organization has a lack of credibility then they will most likely 
not be allowed to intervene by the disputants. Although the UN has faced failed attempts 
in conflict resolution, be it through mediation or not, it has not stopped being a global 
ambassador for maintaining peace and security. This persistence, I argue, has allowed for 
the UN to maintain its credibility within the international community. The United 
Nations, however, provides much more than credibility, it provides legitimacy to the 
process. “Among these roles, mediators play an important role in legitimizing the process 
and outcome of negotiations. In performing such a role, legitimate power is necessary. 
For instance, the UN and regional organizations have different sources of legitimacy” (Iji 
2017: 94). The UN has unique legitimacy for it has been one of the longest standing 
organizations that seek to maintain peace and security in the international community. 
Mediation efforts that are one way or another tied to the United Nations provide great 
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credibility and legitimacy. Lastly, leverage can be a useful tool for a mediator to use. 
Leverage gives the mediator a greater source of power and strength during the process. 
“The tool of leverage at the disposal of the international community through the United 
Nations encompass three types of ways to influence the behavior of recalcitrant actors: 
physical force; economic and political leverage, including the carrot of assistance or the 
stick of sanctions; and ostracism or embarrassment” (Quarterman 2004: 145). Many 
sources of leverage are available through the United Nations; however, it does not 
necessarily mean that leverage is only possible through the UN. Individual mediators can 
equally have leverage over the parties. Mediators can withhold information from one side 
in order for the other to make concessions, however the mediator should be very careful 
in using this strategy. Sometimes parties can become too obstinate when it comes to 
making concessions. Mediators can equally help disputants, especially the insurgents to 
build up a positive reputation before the citizens of the country; however, they can 
equally distort that reputation. Through mediation, belligerents can build up their 
credibility before society, especially if they aspire to be politically active. Trust, 
credibility and leverage are three essential tools that mediators must possess or use during 





El Salvador and FMLN 
History of the Conflict 
The East and West competition during the Cold War exacerbated many 
revolutions or proxy wars in Central and South America, mostly also because of the 
economic inequality that the many countries in this region were going through. The civil 
conflict in El Salvador was a consequence of this, contributing to this revolution was the 
support given by the Soviet Union. The civil war in El Salvador was not because of 
ethnic or racial divisions but rather because of ideology and class. The Farabundo Martí 
National Liberation Front (FMLN) was a Marxist revolutionary group whose goals were 
largely politically and economically oriented as they sought land and political reform. 
Additionally, they wanted to transition to a democratic political regime and end the 
Salvadorian repressive security apparatus. The FMLN was officially created in October 
1980 made up of five different guerrilla leftist groups. “The Salvadoran rebels evolved 
due to deep anger from decades of dictatorship, which festered among the lower classes 
and frustrated the emerging middle class” (Herrera 2008: 10). One of the many examples 
was the story of Ana Guadalupe Martínez a member of the FMLN. In an interview with 
Jean Krasno, Ana is asked the reason for having joined ERP which later on became part 
of FMLN, and her answer was the following:  
It was personal; I didn’t have a special motivation per se. I believe that the 
fundamental motivation came from two things: first the Christian 
formation of my family and second the direct relationship I had with the 
faculty of medicine, as a medical student, with the reality of the disease 
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and the health conditions of the majority of the Salvadorans. It is such an 
extensive phenomenon of an unhealthy population, of a population with 
many difficulties to find an answer to a health problem that has motivated 
me to participate in the revolutionary struggle (Krasno 1997: 2-3). 
Many of these rebels were well educated and understood that the only way to obtain that 
change they so desired was through a revolution. These rebels witnessed the 
consequences of economic inequality, which in the case of Ana was an unhealthy 
population in El Salvador. The civil war set off with the assassination of Archbishop 
Oscar Arnulfo Romero by extreme rightists; this not only led to the final formation of the 
FMLN in December of 1980 but later on also led to a rebel military attack on the 
government, seeking to over throw it (Howard 2007). In reality it was difficult for one 
side to defeat the other because El Salvador received military and financial support from 
the United States while the FMLN also received military support from Cuba, the Soviet 
Union and the Sandinista government in Nicaragua (Howard 2007). The aid that El 
Salvador was receiving from the United States led the FMLN to resort to guerilla tactics 
instead of waging open war. At times, negotiations were attempted through President 
José Napoleon Duarte with the FMLN but they were unsuccessful because Duarte said 
that a provisional government was out the question (Stern 1987). As the FMLN’s main 
political goal of power sharing and a provisional government were not going to be 
addressed, the FMLN did not show up to negotiate. Two important things happened that 
changed the course of the conflict. In June 1989, Alfredo Cristiani became president of El 
Salvador. He was known to be “[a] decent, honorable, and courageous man with the will 
and determination to reconcile his country and achieve permanent peace, Cristiani was 
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undoubtedly the man who anchored the peace agreement for El Salvador” (Arria 2004: 
64). It was under the presidency of Cristiani that both groups faced a military stalemate 
calling for the intervention of a third-party. This is when the United Nations, along with 
Álvaro de Soto come in to mediate the conflict in search for sustainable peace. The 
second important thing that happened before official negotiations started was President 
George Bush taking over for President Reagan. Unlike Bush, Reagan believed that the 
only solution to the conflict in El Salvador was through military means. Bush on the other 
hand, understood that not only was a military solution not possible but that it was 
necessary to have the participation of certain Latin American countries and of course the 
full intervention of the United Nations (Howard 2007). These two changes brightened the 
path for full open negotiations to take place between the Salvadorian government and the 
FMLN. Since both groups had reached a military stalemate they were both aware that 
only an intermediary would be able to help them reach sustainable peace, in this case 
international organizations can provide the support to do so. “First, international 
organizations are usually resorted to because no other actor has been able, or is in a 
position to, be an effective intermediary. One result of this is that international 
organizations are often presented with the thorniest or most intractable of problems” 
(Jonah 1992: 176-177). Organizations such as the United Nations are seen as a legitimate 
actor to take on such burdens of resolving international conflict; partly because of the 
immense experience they have acquired in maintaining peace and security. In the rest of 
the chapter, I will show the great amount of contribution from the United Nations to the 




The Road to the Chapultepec Accords 
After more than a decade of war and more than 75,000 deaths both groups saw the 
need for a peaceful process. The conflict was ripe and there was commitment from both 
parties to reach a solution. One of the key players in helping both groups come together 
to negotiate was the Contadora Group made up of Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela and 
Panama. “The aim of the Group was to create an informal and independent Latin 
American mechanism to intervene in the Central American region where two 
superpowers had been entangled in the conflict, and where the Organization of American 
States (OAS) has proved incapable of taking action” (Arria 2004: 58). It was the 
Contadora Group who laid the foundations for the peace process in El Salvador and 
insisted that the United Nations mediate the conflict.  
After a series of diplomatic moves, including a joint letter supporting the 
U.N.’s mediation in the conflict signed by then-Secretary of State James 
Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Scheverdnaze, U.N. Secretary-
General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar on April 4, 1990, announced that the 
United Nations would act as mediator. Álvaro de Soto assumed the role of 
mediator on behalf of the Secretary General (Call 2002: 505).  
Álvaro de Soto now had the task to work out a framework for negotiations, which turned 
out to be very challenging for de Soto. Since the FMLN was very skeptical about face-to-
face negotiations without the presence of a mediator, de Soto had to play a very active 
role in the negotiations. Specifically he used a technique that “…consists of consulting 
with the parties on each issue and subsequently submitting a text to them, as far as 
possible simultaneously, and then discussing it with each of the separately and revising it 
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in light of their reactions so as to narrow down differences, repeating the exercise as 
many times as necessary “ (De Soto 1999: 359). Through this whole process Álvaro de 
Soto was able to create a framework for peace negotiations, which is known as the 
Geneva Agreements signed on April 7, 1990.  
The next step would be to create a general agenda and a timetable in order to 
reach successful peace negotiations. The FMLN insisted that the first thing on the agenda 
should be to address the subject of the armed forces. Surprisingly the last thing on the 
agenda was economic and land reform, which was their main goal as an insurgent group. 
The FMLN saw military reform as one of their priorities because it was important to its 
own safe reentry to civilian life and later on to be able to exercise power through 
democratic elections (Call 2002). Cristiani’s government more than anything wanted to 
reach peace and they, therefore, did not oppose anything that was proposed by the FMLN 
when it came to the agenda. Álvaro de Soto was surprised by this and narrates:  
The government surprised me by agreeing to the FMLN’s proposal that 
the initial objective would be to reach political agreements on the seven 
agenda items before a cease-fire would be negotiated. Even though the 
government’s overriding goal—perhaps its sole one—was to stop the 
fighting and dismantle the FMLN, it was willing to wait until the FMLN 
obtained the political agreements it pursued before the government’s own 
goals were even addressed” (De Soto 1999: 363).  
This part of the process became known as the Caracas Agreement, which was signed in 
May 1990. This agreement set some challenges to the FMLN because of the timelines 
they had to meet but Álvaro de Soto helped them overcome this problem. 
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After having agreed that the first thing on the agenda should be military reform it 
proved to be impossible to get it through during the negotiations in San José, Costa Rica. 
“When early agreements on the armed forces (and most other items on the agenda) 
proved to be impossible, in July 1990, the UN intermediary Álvaro de Soto put the issues 
of human rights on the table and, after a day of intense negotiations, the San José 
Agreement was signed” (Johnstone 1995: 18). The issue of human rights was essential 
for the FMLN because of all the deaths that the war caused. Many people felt resentment 
towards the rebels and for them this was their opportunity to show commitment to the 
process because they aspired to have political participation. Not only did they want to 
show their followers that negotiations were effectively happening but it was also a way to 
garner more support. After having reached the first main accord it was necessary for the 
United Nations to verify that these agreements would in fact be put into practice and 
respected. The United Nations had already previously culminated peacekeeping missions 
that ended up being successful. However, it was a first for the United Nations to begin 
their ground operation—ONUSAL—before the declaration of a cease-fire agreement 
(Howard 2007). To begin their groundwork before a cease-fire was very difficult for the 
United Nations because it was not something that they had previously done but it was 
something that both parties were requesting. The UN was very hesitant about starting the 
peacekeeping mission like this mainly because of the security issue, they did not want to 
face casualties as the had in previous peacekeeping missions. On one side the FMLN was 
being pressured by local non-governmental organizations and on the other side the 
government was not so enthusiastic about early deployment but if they opposed they 
feared damaging their credibility in the process (Johnstone 1995). Several other 
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agreements were signed thereafter, which addressed other issues on the agenda such as 
police reform, human rights and judicial issues and socio-economic issues. 
After more than two years of constant negotiations a peace agreement would be 
signed in Mexico City.  
After the 31 December 1991 act of New York, the government and FMLN 
representatives embraced and declared they had reached agreement on all 
outstanding issues, that the final Peace Agreement would be signed at Mexico 
City on 16 January 1992, that a cease-fire would take effect on 1 February 
1992 and that the armed conflict would end formally on 31 October 1992 
(Fishel and Corr 1998: 206).  
This peace agreement came to be known as the Chapultepec Agreement, the conclusion 
of a serious of agreements in an agenda that contained many issues. The signing of the 
final accord meant that ONUSAL’s mandate and observation increased. They not only 
had to observe the San José agreement, which addressed human rights issues, but it now 
had to verify and monitor the implementation of all the agreements. Although the road to 
the Chapultepec Agreement contains many more details and events, I have focused on 
what stands out the most in the whole process. It is also worthy to highlight the work 
done by Álvaro de Soto and The Friends Group, which I will address below. 
Álvaro de Soto – The Mediator 
Álvaro de Soto has been recognized as one of the most important characters in the 
peace process between the Salvadorian government and the FMLN. Without his work as 
mediator it would have been impossible to reach a peace agreement. Although he was not 
part of ONUSAL he was a great contributor in helping each party get there. The UN was 
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invited to play the role as mediator throughout the peace process, but the central mediator 
was Álvaro de Soto. “The aim of de Soto was to keep the Salvadoran government and the 
FMLN in continuous talks in order to build an atmosphere of trust” (Fishel and Corr 
1998: 205). To begin with, the great amount of distrust, especially from the FMLN, 
meant that de Soto’s main challenge was either to build trust between the two groups or 
to overcome that trust issue and help both parties reach an agreement. De Soto himself 
narrates the challenges that the lack of trust created. “Because of acute distrust between 
the parties that ruled out direct give-and-take, we wrote much of what they signed as 
agreements, unassisted by anyone out of the employ of the UN Secretariat” (De Soto 
1999: 350). The lack of trust was evident in such things as military reform. The FMLN 
wanted to purge the military because they feared for their security once they gave up their 
weapons. This lack of trust led to both parties not wanting to engage in face-to-face 
negotiations, which increased the role of de Soto as a mediator. It was not only about 
building trust between the two parties but a lot of it had to do with negotiations and the 
incentives that came with it. 
The duty of a mediator, in this case de Soto, was to persuade both parties on how 
they would benefit from reaching a negotiated peace agreement. It wasn’t just about 
telling them how they would benefit or not, he had to show them how and in what way 
they would benefit from the peace agreement. Incentives can play a big role during 
negotiations, as de Soto explains in the case of El Salvador: “In El Salvador, the 
government basically wanted to end the war, to end the onslaught on the state and its 
resources, and to do so by placating or accommodating the desires of the main supporters 
of the insurgency. The insurgents, on the other hand, wanted very far-reaching reforms” 
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(Accord 2008: 24). De Soto had the job of going back and forth between each group and 
presenting his proposals but also at the same time to make sure that each party made 
concessions, otherwise it would be impossible to reach a solution. With the FMLN, de 
Soto assured that he could help them obtain a good amount of the demands they were 
asking for, the initial reasons they became an insurgent group in the first place. On the 
other side, de Soto told the government that he could in fact help them end the war and 
reach sustainable peace. This longed for peace could be reached as long as they could 
accommodate the reforms that were needed, which were the demands of the FMLN. The 
government was very flexible when it came to this part because of the leverage that the 
United States had on them. They pressured the Salvadorian government with 
withdrawing economic aid if they did not comply or make things easy by cooperating. It 
is not to say that the Salvadorian government gave in to the FMLN’s every demand 
because that was not the case. Yes, they were flexible but they also stood their ground in 
many reforms, for example military reform, which the government refused to completely 
agree to per the demand of the FMLN.  
De Soto made sure to not only protect his role as the only mediator but also 
oppose pressure that could consequently harm the negotiations. The FMLN thought that 
the Security Council was heavily influenced by the United States and that the U.S. could 
easily pressure them into doing something. This made the FMLN skeptical of the UN’s 
intervention in the conflict and they proposed the creation of a group that would advise 
the Secretary-General in order to counterbalance the weight of the Security Council (De 
Soto 1999). Of course he opposed this proposal because he saw that the interference of 
more than one mediator in the conflict could cause the parties to potentially play one off 
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against the other. He made the commitment of nothing more than to be impartial. Some 
might have accused him of being biased towards the FMLN, I on the other hand argue 
against this. Looking into the details of the conflict, it is clear that Cristiani was committed 
to achieving peace. At the same time the government was willing to make the necessary 
concessions in order for sustainable peace to be possible. Most of the reform proposals on 
behalf of the FMLN were accepted by the government but not to the point where the 
government was left completely vulnerable before the FMLN. Álvaro de Soto was in 
charge of going back and forth between the two parties and if it were true that he was in 
fact biased then we would most likely not see the still continuous peace in El Salvador.  
Four Plus One 
No negotiation is ever exempt from facing setbacks and the case of El Salvador 
and the FMLN faced many. This was particularly because of the lack of trust by the 
FMLN. In order to prevent further setbacks to the process the United Nations adopted the 
strategy of the Group of Friends. This group was made up Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela 
and Spain, and in a certain way reflected back to the Contadora Group, which had 
become ineffective. “Once the Secretary-General decided to engage the United Nations, 
the role of the Friends became that of supporters and facilitators of the Secretary-General 
in his efforts to negotiate and conclude a sound peace and reconciliation agreement” 
(Arria 2004: 65). Throughout the process the role of the group of friends was to exert 
pressure on both of the parties to continue on the path to sustainable peace. The United 
States became the plus one in the group and basically was the main actor that held the 
most leverage over the government of El Salvador. The group of friends interfered when 
obstacles presented themselves during reform negotiations. One of the examples was the 
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reform of the police force where there was disagreement on whether or not to allow 
previous military police into the new civilian force. Since this concept was a critical part 
of the reform, the group of friends proposed that there be a two-year transition where not 
only could current police officers remain in the force, but former FMLN combatants 
could also enroll themselves in the new police academy (Krasno 2004). One of the most 
important interventions from the group of friends was when the negotiations encountered 
a crisis in December 1991, a few hours before Javier Perez de Cuellar’s term would be 
over. In a way they stretched the level of trust that they had with the Secretary-General 
but if it had not been for this trust, the final agreement would not have been signed. They 
insisted that the Secretary-General become more involved in the culmination of a final 
agreement or else all would be in vain. The agreement was finally settled at midnight but 
if it had not been for the pressure that the group of friends exerted on the Secretary-
General, they would have never signed that final agreement (Arria 2004). 
The Ad Hoc and Truth Commissions 
The Chapultepec Peace Accords brought comprehensive reforms to the armed 
forces, police, justice system, electoral system, and land and economic reforms 
(Chapultepec Agreement - UN Peacemaker 1992). This agreement also allowed for the 
FMLN to become an active political party, which continues to exist up to date. The 
Chapultepec Peace Accords didn’t just bring peace to a twelve yearlong conflict, but also 
demanded justice because of the serious human rights violations this war brought with it. 
One of the steps to secure peace and to administer justice was the creation of the ad hoc 
commission. This commission was meant to purify the Salvadorian military of those who 
used their positions to commit crimes against the population. “The origin of the ad hoc 
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commission was the desire of the FMLN to oust the tandona class of 1966 graduates of 
the Salvadoran military academy, who dominated the army and public security forces” 
(Johnstone 1995: 31-32). The Salvadorian military was responsible for the majority of 
deaths and human rights violations during the twelve years of war. The ad hoc 
commission was meant to restore trust between the population and the armed forces. 
Although the government opposed a direct purged of the armed forces proposed by the 
FMLN, they did agree on doing a self-purge. “By taking on powerful military officers, 
including the High Command, the Ad Hoc Commission provided what Buergental 
referred to as “the first clear indication…that the days of ‘business as usual,’ of military 
impunity and cover-ups, might be over” (Ladutke 2004: 106). This commission in 
particular was very delicate precisely because it was dealing with the military, which at 
the same time could stall the peace process if they wanted to. The commission called for 
the removal of several senior officers who were thought to have been integral to the 
peace process (Johnstone 1995). Although the removal of the listed military officers was 
stalled because they were waiting for the report of the truth commission, in the end the 
listed officers were removed from power. Nevertheless some were allowed to retire 
whenever they wanted and even with full honors, which was a hypocrisy but perhaps 
necessary to prevent a military coup. The truth commission, however, helped to provide a 
great amount of information regarding human rights violations, a parallel to the ad hoc 
commission. 
The truth commission was meant to report the names of those who had committed 
human rights violations from both the government and the FMLN. “The Commission, led 
by well-respected international figures, was established to investigate “serious acts of 
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violence… whose impact on society urgently demands that the public should know the 
truth” about those acts; this task included naming those responsible, when possible” 
(Thale and Beltrán 2013). The main priority in this commission was the investigation of 
death squads, which led to the death of thousands of Salvadorians. This commission 
could gather information and conduct interviews with the objective of giving people the 
opportunity to know the truth of the atrocities committed during the time of war. The 
truth commission, although in a way was meant to alleviate the fears of many did not 
have much power per se. “It was authorized to recommend binding legal, political, or 
administrative measures that followed from the investigations, but it was expressly 
forbidden from functioning as a judicial body” (Jonhstone 1995: 34). Even though 
serious human rights violations were committed the truth commission had no power to 
prosecute these individuals. The commission did not even recommend punishment for the 
names listed in the report because the judiciary branch of the government did not have 
the capacity to prosecute these people. The commission hoped that through its report it 
could provide some sort of relief to the population and allow them to leave all the 
committed atrocities behind and enjoy the coming peace. Neither the FMLN nor the 
government was fully satisfied with the truth commission and its recommendations. The 
government stated that the commission was biased and was persecuting government 
officials only. While government officials committed most of the violations, President 
Cristiani quickly called for amnesty before the release of the report closing the 
opportunity of many of the names in the report to be prosecuted (Johnstone 1995). The 
FMLN on the other hand accepted the commission’s accusations but refused to comply 
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unless the government did so. The UN furthermore was not so lenient, they urged for the 
recommendations in the truth commission to be implemented and pushed hard for justice. 
One of the last and most important contents of the final peace agreement was La 
Comisión Nacional para la Consolidación de la Paz (National Commission for the 
Consolidation of Peace) (COPAZ). COPAZ was an essential piece of the agreement after 
the mediation process on behalf of the United Nations and Álvaro de Soto. COPAZ was 
meant to oversee and make sure that every part of the peace agreements was implemented. It 
allowed for civilians to actively participate in the change that would come from the 
negotiations and in this way implement the accords. In order for it to be impartial, 
COPAZ was made up of two government representatives, two FMLN representatives and 
one representative of each coalition from the legislative (Review of Agreement: 
Chapultepec Peace Agreement, n.d.). Although COPAZ culminated its objective in 1996 
declaring El Salvador a success it was thought to be weak when it came to the 
implementation of the accords. In an interview with Jean Krasno, FMLN member Miguel 
Saenz stated the following about COPAZ: “I wish to reiterate that in terms of monitoring 
compliance with the peace agreements, COPAZ did not gain authority and did not fully 
fulfill its role as a national supervisory body” (Saenz 1997: 28). COPAZ may have lacked 
the necessary tools to fully monitor compliance of the peace agreement but it did a great 
job in such things as proposals for draft laws for the electoral code, assistance to the disabled 
due to the war and many decrees to implement land reform. Had COPAZ not been a 





El Salvador After ONUSAL 
There is no doubt that El Salvador had many firsts for the United Nations when it 
comes to peacekeeping. Both Álvaro de Soto and the Group of Friends were key players 
in helping El Salvador and the FMLN reach a final peace agreement, which led to 
ONUSAL. With the presence of de Soto as the main mediator and representative of 
Javier Perez de Cuellar, he was able to build trust with both parties and use his previous 
negotiation experience in the process. De Soto has been recognized for his many 
contributions to the process and has led him to mediate other civil conflicts. Until this 
day, El Salvador continues to enjoy sustainable peace, where the need for revolution has 
been replaced with the protection of peace. Although the country faces challenges when it 





Colombia and FARC 
History of the Conflict 
The civil conflict between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia–People’s Army (FARC-EP) is known as one of the longest 
running civil conflicts to date. Some argue that the FARC has gone astray from their 
initial goals but that is yet to be seen in the current peace negotiations.  
The foundations of the FARC began forming in 1964, 16 years after the 
assassination of the populist Liberal Party leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán little 
more than 10 years after the establishment of a military government under 
Gustavo Rojas, when the Communist Party was outlawed the government 
began officially excluding the left. (Lee 2012: 30). 
Jorge Eliécer Gaitan, a Liberal Party member, was a man who offered hope to the 
millions of impoverished Colombians who at that time were suffering from the lack of 
social and economic reforms. His assassination triggered major uprisings and deaths 
between the conservative and liberal party, which came to be known as La Violencia. 
Like many of the militant groups in Central and South American, the FARC formed 
during the Cold War. Under the Marxist- Leninist ideology, the FARC found its 
inspiration in the Cuban Revolution. The initial goal of the FARC was to represent 
Colombia’s rural poor by seizing power and establishing a new government through 
armed revolution. The FARC is one of the oldest active guerrilla groups in Latin 
America, now also considered a terrorist group, because of the tactics that it has used to 
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achieve its so called political goals and the number of people that have died has reached 
staggering numbers.  
Since its formation, the FARC has been able to garner much support on the local-
government level, which has made it difficult to defeat with military tactics. “No real 
attempts were made to negotiate with the guerrillas until 1982, when Conservative 
President Belisario Betancur (1982-6) was elected on a platform that included a 
commitment to peace” (Boudon 1996: 282). He declared general amnesty and peace talks 
consequently began but the amnesty did not demand disarmament, which led to failure of 
the premature peace process. “Betancur’s position was a radical departure from that of his 
predecessors, for he recognized that guerrilla violence was the product of real social 
conditions and he understood the relationship between those conditions and the demands 
of the insurgents” (Leech 2011: 41). In Betancour’s presidency the FARC was able to 
create its own political party, Union Patriótica, which for a leftist party garnered a lot of 
support and many of its members were able to occupy political offices. Colombia, 
however, has been known for a mixture of politics and violence and Colombians have 
had to witness the assassination of many political leaders. Many members of the Union 
Patriótica were killed, which led them to either drop out of politics or flee to the jungle to 
join the FARC seeing that the only option to achieve social justice was through armed 
struggle (Leech 2011). After Betancour’s presidency, little interest was shown in wanting 
to negotiate peace with the FARC. Not until the election of President Andrés Pastrana in 
1998, would the talks of peace negotiations with the FARC come up again.  
President Pastrana’s attempt to reach successful peace negotiations with the 
FARC started positively but then showed little prospects. To begin with, he granted the 
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FARC a 16,200 square mile safe haven in order to start peace talks that were meant to 
build confidence, which also started without a cease-fire agreement (Leech 2011). The 
fact that these negotiations started without a cease-fire meant that outside of the haven 
area there were still confrontations between the army and the FARC. Pastrana broke three 
years of peace talks when Senator Jorge Gechen Turbay was kidnapped by the FARC 
(Colombian army moves against rebels 2002). While both sides were to blame for the 
failed peace talks, one of the major reasons for failure was that the conflict was not ripe yet. 
“[N]either side was at the moment that Zartman calls ‘hurting stalemate,’ that is, the 
conviction that they could no longer achieve their goals, at a tolerable cost, through 
violence, and that, therefore, they ran the risk that in the future their relative positions 
would weaken” (Tokatlian 2004: 639). Both parties were really seeking to amass their 
military power in order to have the possibility to defeat either side; neither party had yet 
realized that a military victory would not be possible.  
Final Peace Talks 
Disillusioned by the previous failed attempts to reach a peaceful solution to the 
insurgency problem in Colombia, President Álvaro Uribe was elected in 2002 under a 
campaign that promised to be hard on the FARC and that no peace talks would occur 
unless there was a cease-fire agreement. During his double term presidency, President 
Uribe only once came close to initiating peace talks between his administration and the 
FARC. There were several reasons why negotiations under Uribe never came close. To 
start, there was a great amount of distrust between the two parties; second President 
Uribe never recognized that there was an internal armed conflict, he saw the FARC as a 
terrorist group; third he wanted the FARC to give up their arms but didn’t want to 
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negotiate the conflict; fourth whenever he would come close to start negotiations he 
would always end up insulting the FARC on TV or on the radio making the FARC back 
out of negotiations and; lastly, because of the way Uribe spoke against the FARC, they in 
turn hated him (Acosta 2016). In a letter written to Henry Acosta Patiño, the mediator in 
this conflict, from FARC member Pablo Catatumbo he said: “I regret that this time we 
have not been able to reach a good solution. But it’s just that, with people so petty, 
cheating and double faced as those who wrongly govern this country, things become very 
difficult” (Acosta 2016: 184). The FARC saw President Uribe as a cheater whom they 
were simply unable to negotiate with. The FARC also feared to sit down to negotiate 
peace in Colombia because they feared for their own security, this all changed when 
President Juan Manuel Santos was elected in 2010. 
At the beginning of President Santos’ presidency, peace talks between the FARC 
and the Colombian government looked more promising than ever. Henry Acosta Patiño 
saw the new presidency as a fresh opportunity to start the talks between the Colombian 
government and the FARC. He knew that the conflict had already reached a hurting 
stalemate and the only way out was to seek peace through negotiations. On September 
2012 in Havana, Cuba, under the presidency of Juan Manuel Santos, peace talks formally 
began and after years of negotiations on November 24, 2016, “…[t]he Colombian 
government and FARC guerrillas declared the final day of one of the world’s oldest wars 
with the signing of a ceasefire agreement to end more than 50 years of bloodshed” 
(Brodzinsky and Watts 2016). After many years of conflict, a cease-fire agreement was 
signed; this would give even more prospects for a final peace agreement. Unlike in the 
previous failed attempts, the cease-fire agreement meant a lot in this case. The FARC and 
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the Colombian government asked for the United Nations to continue overseeing the 
cease-fire agreement even though the final agreement was rejected by 50.2% of the 
citizens in a plebiscite. The failure of the plebiscite also forced the Colombian 
government and the FARC to go back to the negotiation table, and the final agreement 
was signed later by all parties and approved by the Colombian Congress.  
If implemented accordingly, the peace accord has potential to further a 
number of promising social reforms. Among other things it is designed to 
lead to rural land reform, guarantee political participation for historically-
excluded political sectors, facilitate the reincorporation of FARC 
guerrillas into civilian life […], provide alternatives to rural farmers who 
grow coca, and fulfill the rights of truth, justice and reparations for 
millions of victims (Sánchez-Garzoli and Londoño 2017). 
After more than half a century of civil conflict, the peace agreement seems to be on its 
way slowly but surely. This is made evident with the presence of the United Nations 
starting March 1 with the laying down of arms. They will identify and register all weapons, 
which include 26 zones for demobilization and disarmament and transition back into 
civilian life. It includes storage of weapons and lastly, planning and verification of the 
destruction of the weapons and munitions in the storage area (UN Mission in Colombia 
2017). Violence between the Colombian government and the FARC has come to an end 
and now it is up to them to continue the implementation of the final peace agreement 





The Guarantors and the Facilitator 
The presence of several international actors was an important support to the peace 
talks. Another reason why previous peace talks failed was the lack of international 
intervention in the dialogues. Third parties can help provide legitimacy to the process and 
can also help the parties adhere to the agreements. In the case of Colombia, many 
neighboring countries provided support along with Norway who is well known to act as a 
third party in many times of conflict. Norway, Cuba, Chile and Venezuela, “…[t]he four 
countries supporting peace talks between the Colombian government and FARC rebels 
have called for an “urgent de-escalation” of armed conflict in the South American 
country” (Mediators urge de-escalation of conflict between Colombia and Farc rebels 
2015). Even with negotiations taking place and before having officially signed the cease-
fire agreement there were still outbreaks of violence. The lack of seriousness from the 
FARC in the process led one of the top negotiators in the peace talks to threaten them 
with their withdrawal during negotiations. Chief rebel negotiator, Ivan Marquez, 
recognized that escalated violence could damage the talks and that public support was 
essential during this process.  
Norway and Cuba [have] served as “guarantor countries” while Chile and 
Venezuela played the role of observers. The four countries were key in 
resolving disputes that arose during the negotiations, building trust between 
the two parties and solving logistical issues. While Cuba hosted the talks, 
Norway provided economic support. Experts from other countries with 




The role and support of these four countries have been essential to the process or better 
branded as the ‘Group of Friends.’ Both Norway and Cuba had the role to make sure that 
both parties adhered to the rules that were agreed upon during the dialogue since trust can 
wane during the process. “In addition to their role as guarantors, they are also observers 
which means that if there is a crisis that may lead to a misunderstanding and 
misinterpretation, the witness’ job is to clarify the disagreed upon points” (Balie 2014: 
11). Even when negotiations faced setbacks, both Cuba and Norway made sure that talks 
continued. Equally, Venezuela played an important role in the process by providing 
locations during the initial meetings between the FARC and Colombian officials, without 
this the talks would have not started or would have faced further challenges. One of the 
greatest contributions by mediators, as mentioned earlier in this thesis, is their ability to 
build trust between the two parties who are unsure of each other’s intentions. There is no 
doubt that these countries contributed, and continue contributing up to this day, to the 
ongoing peace process, now in its implementation. Peace talks without mediators would 
be very difficult and probably even impossible. 
The man worth highlighting in this story is none other than Henry Acosta Patiño, 
who throughout the whole process was referred to as ‘the facilitator’ by the two warring 
parties. In reality without his contribution it would have been impossible for Colombia to 
sign a peace agreement with the FARC. Acosta did what no other person had done in 
previous negotiations attempts and it is difficult to say whether his role was by chance or 
not. An economist and former agriculture expert at the United Nations, he is the secret 
mediator that has guided Colombia to a peace deal. Acosta became involved starting his 
first encounter with the FARC in 1998 where he had the opportunity to chat with FARC 
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commander, Pablo Catatumbo (J. Acosta 2016). Initially Acosta had been assigned a 
project where he had to visit some young kids that had been displaced due to the 
violence. On his way there a small group stopped him and led him to a house. The man 
who received him looked at his resume and he saw that Acosta had worked for the United 
Nations; however, he was even more surprised when Acosta told him he knew that he 
was Pablo Catatumbo, a FARC member, and that they had gone to school together. 
Catatumbo was very impressed by all of this and invited Acosta to continue visiting him, 
because according to him, he was someone he could talk to about politics and books 
(Acosta 2016). This experience described by Acosta himself is what led him to be the key 
person between the FARC and the Colombian government. Who would have thought that 
he had just created a friendship with a top FARC official? 
After that encounter Acosta would find himself traveling in and out of the jungle 
to meet with Catatumbo. In a meeting that Acosta had with Catatumbo, he was able to see 
the FARC’s intentions to sit down and negotiate peace: “We are not going to sit down 
and talk to the government about just a humanitarian agreement or exchange or call it 
what you want. Once seated, we will take advantage and talk about the possibility of 
negotiating this conflict” (Acosta 2016: 73). Despite the many air attacks that the FARC 
received from the Colombian forces they never changed their minds on the possibility of 
negotiating peace. Neither side could defeat the other and the FARC had more to gain if 
they went through with the negotiations. From 2002 until 2016, when the final peace 
agreement was signed, Acosta remained the main key of communication between the 
FARC and the government. During the Uribe presidency, peace talks were impossible 
because of the lack of trust that existed between the two parties and of course the words 
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that Uribe expressed about the FARC. Uribe did not take advantage of the opportunity 
and the mediator that he had before him. When President Juan Manuel Santos took office, 
Acosta immediately wrote to him and proposed to open up peace dialogues with the 
FARC and Santos immediately seized the opportunity. He didn’t waste any time, but 
rather organized everything in order for the FARC and Colombian officials to meet 
secretly. He then set a place to start official negotiations, later took place in Havana, 
Cuba. Acosta describes his role as the mediator in this conflict:  
I never met with anyone else, I am not a parallel table, I try to help solve 
the crucial issues that interfere and sometimes with messages that can’t be 
passed by the table or by other people. It is necessary to understand that 
the facilitator not only has to have the confidence of the President of the 
Republic but also of the FARC, a condition that is not easy to find (Acosta 
2016: 210).  
For about 14 years Acosta acted as the facilitator between the Colombian government 
and the FARC and there were times that he wouldn’t give a message to the FARC 
because he knew that that would slow down the negotiations. When he had to write a 
letter, for example, to the FARC on behalf of the government, government officials 
would revise the letter and ask him to change a specific word. In the end, he did not 
change the wording because he felt that that was how it should be written. Little things 
like this are what I believe also contributed to a successful encounter between the two 
groups. More than anyone, Acosta knew what needed to be said and when, more than 
anything he had to use the trust and relationship he had built with Catatumbo to find 
peace for a country so badly in need of it.  
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Acosta’s activities were kept secret because of the kind of role that he had in the 
negotiations. He was not a person who had experience mediating international conflicts 
but destiny allowed for him to build a friendship with one of the top official of the FARC, 
which eventually led to successful peace talks.  
Acosta’s role in bringing the FARC and government together for talks was 
confirmed by top officials, including government peace negotiator Sergio 
Jaramillo. “Henry played an extremely important role. We started 
exchanging messages with the FARC through Henry Acosta,” said 
Jaramillo, who is also high peace commissioner. “Without Henry none of 
this would have happened, that is the reality”. (Reuters 2016). 
Acosta was able to be a successful mediator because of the special relationship he built 
with FARC leaders but at the same time also encouraged President Santos not to give up 
on the negotiations. The presidency more than anything entrusted him with the task of 
being the means of communication between them and the FARC. They recognized that it 
was only Acosta who could perform this task. After all the hard work from both Acosta 
and the other supporting governments, the FARC and the Colombian government were 
able to reach a peace deal. The main point that Acosta teaches us in mediation is that the 
key to bringing about a successful process is trust. Without trust nothing is possible. 
Although doubt will one way or another be present during negotiations because the 
parties don’t know what to expect of each other, as long as there is trust between the 
mediator and the warring parties, that is enough to get the ball rolling. After trust there 
come other crucial things such as credibility and leverage. Norway was able to exert its 
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leverage by threatening to withdraw from the peace negotiations. Both international third 
parties and mediators as individuals make a big difference in the outcome. 
Truth, Coexistence and Non-Repetition Commission 
The final peace agreement contains rural reform and political participation that 
seeks to take advantage of the democratic opportunity to represent different visions and 
interests in society by allowing FARC-EP to participate in politics. The parties to the 
accord agree to end the conflict through a ceasefire, to lay down arms, and to seek a 
definitive solution to the illicit drugs problem in Colombia. A truth commission and the 
commission to verify the implementation of the accords are included in the peace 
process. The process of peace is not just about signing a final peace agreement so 
everyone can go home. After the peace agreement is signed, this is when all the hands-on 
work comes into the picture. In this case, one of the most important things to address is 
seeking reparations for the victims who have been affected by more than half a century of 
war. The truth commission, also known as the Truth, Coexistence and Non-Repetition 
Commission, seeks to elucidate the patterns of violence during the conflict but never acts as 
a prosecuting organ. “Its objectives are to: Contribute toward the historical clarification of 
what happened; Promote and contribute to the recognition of the victims; of responsibility for 
those that were involved directly or indirectly in the armed conflict; and of the society as 
a whole for what happened; and Promote coexistence across the country” (Summary of 
Colombia’s Agreement to End Conflict and Build Peace 2016: 29). This commission will 
have a period of six months to establish itself and three years to complete its objective, 
the commission will be not be rushed in any way. The commission will neither list names 
in the final report nor make recommendations of punishment. It is meant to be more 
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welcoming to perpetrators who don’t want to incriminate themselves yet want to confess 
and for victims who want to speak out about the happenings but fear retributions 
(Isacson, 2013). This does not mean amnesty will be granted, since the judicial body can 
seek justice on its own against individuals who have committed any atrocity during the 
time of war. Regardless of whether the state will seek justice on its own or not, there will 
be a Special Jurisdiction for Peace which will perform judicial functions on behalf of the 
Colombian State. They will investigate, prosecute and sanction any crime that was 
committed during the conflict; there will be no pardon or amnesty (Summary of 
Colombia’s Agreement to End Conflict and Build Peace 2016). These types of 
commissions are common in transitions to peace from armed conflicts and they seek to 
recognize the rights of the victims. 
Equally important in the signing of any final peace agreement is making sure that 
all parties comply with the commitments that they have made. The Follow-up, Verification, 
and Dispute Resolution Commission for the Final Agreement (CSRV) will establish several 
mechanisms for the implementation and verification of all commitments in the final peace 
agreement. This commission will be made up of three government representatives and 
three FARC-EP representatives.  
The Commission will be in charge, amongst other functions, of: (1) solving 
the differences or unforeseen situations which may arise from the 
interpretation of the agreement; (2) following up the agreement and 
verifying its compliance and (3) organizing a system of thematic and 
territorial commissions for the exercise of its functions, with broad citizen 
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participation (Summary of Colombia’s Agreement to End Conflict and 
Build Peace 2016: 329).  
The commission will a have duration of about 10 years and is expected to start in 2019.  
It will seek to resolve any differences that may come up between the parties during the 
implementation of the accords and make sure neither party goes astray from what has 
been agreed upon. “This mission will aim to make recommendations to the Government 
to ensure greater autonomy and independence in the electoral organization and modernize 
and make the system more transparent” (Gobierno y FARC instalan comisión de 
verificación del acuerdo 2016). In a country who has been plagued by corruption on all 
government levels this will be of great importance in creating a more transparent system 
and at the same time restoring trust in the governing system by the people. The CSRV 
will work to establish a framework to make sure that all aspects of the agreement are 
fulfilled. It will also build the necessary institutions for the funding of the framework, 
which is vital in successfully monitoring compliance.  
Restoring Peace 
An air of peace can finally be felt among Colombians. One of the biggest 
insurgencies in Colombia and one of the longest insurgencies in the world has finally 
reached an agreement with the Colombian government. The UN’s mission to Colombia 
has already begun with the laying down of arms, and the UN will be in charge of 
verifying the agreement’s implementation. Unfortunately Colombia continues to face 
new challenges. “While the FARC accord has significantly reduced overall violence in 
the country, the demobilization of these fighters has created vacuums throughout the 
country, which are in turn being occupied by paramilitary successor organizations…” 
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(Sánchez-Garzoli and Londoño 2017). Colombia has yet to finish addressing its problem 
of other insurgency groups such as the ELN and other paramilitary groups, which are 
taking advantage of the zones where FARC has evacuated. Colombia still has a long way 
to go when it comes to enjoying full peace. However, from this specific conflict it is important 
to highlight the role that mediators and third parties have. When there is commitment to 






Mediation has proven to be a useful tool when and only certain requirements are 
met. Colombia and El Salvador have not been the only countries plagued by civil conflict 
that have enjoyed the benefits of mediation. If international actors continue to turn to 
mediation practices as a way to solve civil conflict it must mean that something about it is 
working. However, one of the requirements for mediation to be successful must be that 
all conflicting parties have reached a hurting stalemate where no group can defeat the 
other or in the case of the insurgent group, it cannot reach its goal through armed 
revolution. Both groups must be willing to sit and negotiate a peace agreement where the 
issues of all parties will be addressed and an agreement will be reached where it will 
benefit both parties to the extent that no party will be left loosing more than it can gain. If 
solutions to the conflicts mentioned above have been achievable, it is for several reasons. 
For starters, initial negotiations took place outside the home country. In the case of 
Colombia it took place in Venezuela and in the case of El Salvador it took place in 
Geneva. Initiating the peace process outside of the home country is important especially 
for the insurgent group. Not only does the insurgency fear for their security in their home 
country if they were to initiate negotiations there but there is also that air of distrust 
between the two groups, which creates a greater barrier for negotiations to start. Distrust 
between the two parties is what allows mediators to play an important role in the process. 
Mediators have the immense challenge to create trust between the parties and they 
must assure that all parties will be equally benefitted in the end. In order for the process 
to be successful mediators must build trust, both parties must trust the mediator in that 
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he/she is helping them reach their ultimate goals. When the process becomes stagnant the 
mediator has the duty to keep the process moving and this was evident in the case of 
Álvaro de Soto. Negotiations faced obstacles when both parties couldn’t agree on the 
armed forces reform during the negotiations in Costa Rica, and so, instead de Soto placed 
the issue of human rights on the negotiating table to keep the process moving. Álvaro de 
Soto coming from the United Nations gave an even greater support to the peace process 
in El Salvador because it had the full support of the organization as a whole. The 
Secretary-General was from Latin American and spoke Spanish as did de Soto, this made 
communication easier. Travel to New York was facilitated by the fact that they were 
essentially in the same time zone. El Salvador had many firsts for the United Nations, it 
not only launched ONUSAL before an actual cease-fire was signed but I also created the 
Friends Group, which allowed for further international support. It also created the first 
truth commission where both the government and the FMLN could bring forth their 
grievances and declare crimes committed and those who would do so would not received 
any repercussions. Had all these elements not proven successful they would not have 
been implemented in future peace talks. Until now, these activities have proven to be 
successful in the peace talks in Colombia. 
Up to now, Colombia can be deemed a successful transition from war to peace. It 
has implemented the Friends Group, the truth commission and a commission to make 
sure that all agreements are verified and implemented, all having happened previously in 
El Salvador. Unlike the mediation process in El Salvador where the FMLN reached out to 
Alvaro de Soto to mediate the conflict, Henry Acosta fell into the position of mediator. 
Having previously gone to school with FARC member, Pablo Catatumbo this created the 
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perfect opportunity for him to facilitate the peace process between the FARC and the 
Colombian government. It can be argued that both the FMLN and the FARC placed a 
great amount of trust in the mediator, which consequently led to the signing of a final 
peace agreement. Colombia has become a milestone in the process of seeking peace in 
war torn countries. It proves that no matter how long the conflict or how many 
differences exist between the warring parties there is always room for negotiations, 
making concessions and reaching sustainable peace. During the negotiation phase it is 
equally important to maintain the negotiation agenda as concise and limited as possible, 
not everything can be addressed at the same time and so the core issues are to be the main 
focus. Perhaps one of the main reasons why the peace process in Colombia was 
successful was the isolation it received in Havana, Cuba. Cuba was the ideal place for 
such a long war to finish because of the limitations it gave to other parties who might 
obstruct the talks. For example, Cuba limits the amount of media and has great control on 
who comes in and out of the country, which in the case of Colombia meant a benefit. The 
media has constantly been an enemy between the FARC, the people and the government 
and consequently stalled the peace process at many times. Several methods used in the 
Salvadorian peace process have proven successful in Colombia and equally many 
methods in the Colombian peace process can benefit other parts of the world in the 
termination of conflict, especially Africa that continues to be a continent largely plagued 
by insurgent groups who seek armed struggle. Mediation continues to prove itself as a 
successful method to end civil conflict and to reach sustainable peace, therefore an 
important method to keep in mind as more organizations become involved in maintaining 
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